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C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 001005

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/OPO/FPD, AF/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2030

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AFIN](#) [DJ](#)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REINSTATEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL GUARDS

REF: A:DJIBOUTI 996 B:DJIBOUTI 983

Classified By: DCM David Ball, reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (g).

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT.

2. (C) AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2005, POST HAS REMOVED RESIDENTIAL GUARDS UNDER MANDATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BASED ON BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS. THE REMOVAL OF POST'S RESIDENTIAL GUARD PROTECTION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL SECURITY REALITIES, WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF EMBASSY EMPLOYEES OF ALL AGENCIES TO CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY. POST UNDERSTANDS THAT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS ARE BASED ON SETL'S CRIME RATING, BUT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS IN DJIBOUTI ARE A DETERRENT TO TERRORIST ATTACKS AS WELL AS CRIMINAL ATTACKS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DETERRENT IS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF DJIBOUTI TO SOMALIA AND RECENT THREAT REPORTING (SEE REF A).

3. (C) RESIDENTIAL HOUSING IN DJIBOUTI NOW IMMEDIATELY STANDS OUT FROM NEIGHBORING HOUSES BECAUSE U.S. EMBASSY RESIDENCES ARE THE ONLY RESIDENCES WITHOUT GUARDS. THIS HIGH VISIBILITY, PLUS EXISTING THREATS IN COUNTRY, MAKES EMPLOYEES HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO INCREASED CRIME, HOSTILE SURVEILLANCE, AND TERRORIST ATTACK. EMPLOYEES CANNOT ADEQUATELY SCAN THE EXTERIOR OF THEIR COMPOUNDS FOR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OR ARRIVAL. THERE IS CONSTANT PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC, THE PERSISTENCE OF "SQUATTERS", AND THE PRESENCE OF LOCAL VENDORS THAT MAKE IMPOSSIBLE THE EMPLOYEE'S ABILITY TO JUDGE ADEQUATELY THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE HIS OR HER RESIDENCE. EMPLOYEES HAVE NO WAY TO DETERMINE IF THE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS SURROUNDING THEM ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM THE RESIDENCE ARE HARMLESS OR HAVE CRIMINAL OR TERRORIST INTENT. SUCH A DETERMINATION WAS POSSIBLE WITH RESIDENTIAL GUARDS USED IN THE PAST.

4. (C) REGARDLESS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTER-MEASURES TAUGHT TO AND UTILIZED BY OUR EMPLOYEES, DEPARTURES FROM AND ARRIVALS TO RESIDENCES WILL RESULT IN A POLICY-IMPOSED CHOKE-POINT, RATHER THEN A NATURAL CHOKE-POINT, BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS TO DEPART AND RETURN TO HIS OR HER RESIDENCE EVERY DAY. IT IS A KNOWN FACT THAT ONE OF AL-QA'IDA'S TARGETING SELECTION METHODS INCLUDES WHETHER OR NOT A SELECTED TARGET HAS SECURITY GUARDS WHEN SELECTING A POSSIBLE TARGET. BY REMOVING OUR RESIDENTIAL GUARDS, U.S. EMBASSY EMPLOYEES ARE AT A GREATER RISK OF BECOMING POSSIBLE TERRORIST TARGETS OR VICTIMS OF CRIME. OVER THE PAST YEAR DJIBOUTI HAS SEEN AN INCREASE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY THE RECENT BREAK-IN OF AN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE (SEE REF B). ANOTHER CONCERN IS THAT OTHER AGENCIES (ORA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED APPROVAL) WILL FUND THEIR OWN RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARDS THUS AFFECTING THE MORALE OF STATE EMPLOYEES WHO WILL NOT HAVE GUARDS.

5. (C) POST WOULD THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO CUT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND ALLOW POST TO REINSTATE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS ISSUE CONTACT RSO GARY STONER AT (253) 35 39 95 OR VIA CLASS EMAIL AT STONERGM@STATE.SGOV.GOV.

REGARDS.
RAGSDALE